University-Community Engagement: A grid-group analysis by Low, David
 
 
Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement 
No 1 (2008): 107-127 
© UTSePress and the author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University-Community Engagement: 
A grid-group analysis 
 
 
 
DAVID LOW 
 
 
 
The value of the idea of freedom arises 
only to oppose the idea of necessity. 
(Kevelson 1993, p. 1) 
 
niversity-community engagement is increasingly becoming a 
key focus of Australian universities (see, for example, Australian 
Universities Community Engagement Alliance 2005; Funding 
Australian Universities for Community Engagement 2005; Winter et 
al. 2006; and Innovative Research Universities Australia 2006). There 
is little agreement, however, as to the values underlying the term 
‘community engagement’, or the kind of activities it ought to 
represent. For example, university-community engagement might be 
thought of as a vehicle for teaching and learning, research, 
developing industry and professional links, marketing the university, 
or perhaps enhancing civic altruism. All of these kinds of activities 
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can be described by the term university-community engagement, and 
in an Australian context it is all of these things. It would seem that 
there are a vast number of stakeholders that have become active 
collaborators in the work of Australian universities for an equally 
diverse number of reasons (Commonwealth of Australia 2002). 
In this social context, researchers at universities can no longer 
assume that their findings can be thought of as ‘authorised truth’ and 
simplistically expect the public and its social institutions to accept 
and incorporate the findings of university research programs ‘on 
trust’ (McGee & Lyne 1987). Given the identified trend toward 
engagement and collaboration, I propose that we view the work of 
university-community engagement as being itself a process of 
enquiry rather than a collection of problematically dissociated 
university functions. In this view, university-community engagement 
is transformed into a system that must continue to be responsive to 
the dissent of its constituency, or it does not exist (Low 2003). 
I define dissent as a feeling or way of thinking that opposes an 
accepted viewpoint, and enquiry as a method of communication that 
aims to find out the truth. My argument is that by viewing 
university-community engagement as a process of enquiry that is 
reliant on dissent, we can simultaneously allow two possibilities: 
enquiry can function to keep communication closed to the wider 
community (through its self-referential autonomy), and connected  
to the community (through its communicational commitment to 
engaging with dissent).  
The above dialogical view of university-community engagement 
also suggests that the purpose of enquiry as a whole is something 
internal or immanent to any social system. In this sense, we do not 
‘transfer' or ‘transmit’ knowledge between social systems, but, rather, 
we engage a method that enables the recognition of a shared object of 
enquiry – its entelechy (Nicholls 2000). Thus, a university’s ability to 
stabilise itself in the face of both internal and external challenges is 
founded upon its ability to recognise its own inherent instability and 
continually adjust itself (to learn and grow) in response to this dissent 
(see, for example, Luhmann 1990; and Michael Thompson 1992). 
Universities, therefore, must continually enquire into, and regulate 
their responses to, the surprises dissent embodies if they are to 
survive. In short, the self-reflexive operation of dynamic social 
systems (such as universities) requires that communication as 
enquiry continue interminably. 
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How does a university regulate itself to ensure that 
communication as enquiry continues indefinitely, and how does this 
mode of regulation affect the manner in which universities engage 
with external stakeholders? To answer these questions, we will need 
to examine universities as systems controlled by a system of 
differentiated communication. Following the lead of Kecskes (2006), 
the theory I shall use to guide us in this task is derived from the work 
of anthropologist Mary Douglas.  
 
GRID-GROUP THEORY 
Mary Douglas is well known for her grid-group technique used for 
analysing the dynamics of social systems (see, for example, Douglas 
1973, 1982a, 1982b, 1989, 2001; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 
& Calvez 1990; Mamadouh 1999; and Spickard 1989). Douglas’ 
method is to superimpose two dimensions of social commitment as 
indicated in the diagram below. The term 'grid' is used to represent 
the degree of individuation: ‘The term grid suggests the cross-hatch 
of rules to which individuals are subject in the course of their 
interaction’ (Douglas 1982a, p. 192). Thus, at the top of the diagram is 
strong grid, a place where there are visible rules of control (that is, a 
high degree of social regulation and classification), while at the lower 
end, weak grid, is a place where ‘formal classifications fade, and 
finally vanish’ (Douglas 1982a, p. 191). 
On the other axis, the term 'group' is used to represent a 
dimension of social incorporation: ‘The group itself is defined in 
terms of the claims it makes over its constituent members, the 
boundary it draws around them, the rights it confers on them to use 
its name and other protections, and the levies and constraints it 
applies’ (Douglas 1982a, p. 192). Thus, to the left-hand side of the 
diagram is weak group (weak social incorporation) and to the right 
strong group (strong social incorporation). These twin dimensions 
are used to yield a four-fold model of social organisation. 
 Much of Douglas' use of the model was directed at explaining 
the styles of thinking and behaving characteristic of each of the four  
quadrants, which Douglas called ‘cultures’. The quadrants (A, B, C, 
and D) and their mnemonic titles (individualism, isolates, hierarchy, 
and enclaves) provide four distinctive contexts within which a 
‘cultural bias’ is generated. The cultural bias of each quadrant is 
maintained through the explanations and justifications that seem 
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Douglas' four types of social environment (adapted from Douglas 1982b, p. 11). 
 
plausible to people communicating in each quadrant. Thus, for 
Douglas, each quadrant represents a culture within which certain 
attitudes and behaviours are characteristic: 
 
Square A (low grid, low group) allows options for 
negotiating contracts or choosing allies and in 
consequence it also allows for individual mobility up 
and down whatever the current scale of prestige and 
influence. Square B (high grid, low group) is the 
environment which ascribes closely the way an 
individual may behave. In any complex society some 
categories of people are going to find themselves 
relegated here to do as they are told, without the 
protection and privileges of group membership. 
Square C is the environment of large institutions 
where loyalty is rewarded and hierarchy respected: an 
individual knows his place in a world that is securely 
bounded and stratified. Finally, square D is defined by 
the terms of the analysis as a form of society in which 
only the external group boundary is clear: by 
definition all other statuses are ambiguous and open 
to negotiation. (Adapted from Douglas 1982b, p. 4) 
 
In the present context, we are interested to discover the 
communicational characteristics of the quadrants and their possible 
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relationship to the concerns of university-community engagement 
practitioners and/or researchers. We are also interested to find out 
how dissent functions in each of the quadrants. As noted earlier, 
dissent is a vital communication factor enabling university research 
communities to constitute and maintain themselves through enquiry. 
Both dissent and enquiry are vital to the creation of new knowledge, 
the task of universities. Thus, without a method to nurture and reveal 
dissent, universities would be unable to even recognise different 
ways of being in the world, and enquiry would be rendered 
impossible (Hawes 1999, p. 235). 
To examine what happens to dissent in different social or cultural 
contexts, we shall think about what it would be like to be 
communicating about a specific university-community engagement 
issue under the communicational constraints of the grid-group 
dimensions. What we imagine could be any issue at all – the only 
proviso here is that the issue involves the mobilisation, or the 
possibility of, a dissenting view. This imagining method will allow us 
to discuss how university-community engagement is coordinated in 
different ways via different methods of social organisation (that is, 
via communication). In other words, the grid-group method of 
analysis will enable us to see what it would be like to communicate 
about a specific issue within four distinct ‘communicational 
communities’ (Ransdell 1998). Thus, for our present purpose, the 
grid-group model allows us, as Douglas put it, ‘to understand the 
relation between the inside structure of an organization and the 
insides of its members’ heads’ (Douglas 1989, p. 172). More 
specifically still, we can use the grid-group model to identify 
different methods of university-community engagement, and then 
examine the different ways in which universities might respond to 
dissent, the communicational welding agent for enquiry. 
 
A SEMIOTIC EPISTEME FOR GRID-GROUP ANALYSIS 
Douglas argues that we are ‘unable to conceive of the individual’s 
environment if it is not a group of some kind’ (Douglas 1982a, 
p. 192). In other words, it is impossible to conceive of an individual 
without also thinking about how that individual communicates 
within a group, or with other groups. An individual’s judgement in 
regard to a specific issue is consequently constructed from within an 
evolving social dialogue with other groups (see, for example, 
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Perelman 1982; and Corrington 1994). This much we can agree on. 
What is perhaps missing from Douglas’ conception of ‘environment’, 
however, are influences derived from sources that are ‘other’ than 
the social system itself, that is, from sources the existence of which is 
not attributable to what we want or do not want to be the case. These 
sources, I argue in contrast to Douglas, have a being of their own that 
is independent of what we think about them, for example, 
ecosystems, animals, rocks, plants, or at the most generalised level, 
universes. In my view, a ‘de-anthropologised’ epistemology is 
required if we are to also recognise and become responsive to 
scientific methodologies within the context of a grid-group analysis 
(Luhmann 1989, p. 78). Indeed, without a theory capable of 
encompassing scientific communication methods, much of the work 
of a modern university would remain un-analysable. 
This article therefore puts forward the case for a semiotic 
epistemology in grid-group analysis. I have derived this insight  
from the work of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914). In Peirce’s view, 
communication mediates between an independent reality and our 
reasoning about it (Low 2003). To demonstrate how such an 
approach might operate in the context of grid-group analysis, I am 
next going to locate four different methods of communication in 
Douglas’ grid-group diagram. I will then investigate how each of the 
four communication methods I identify function as an enquiry 
system for university-community engagement. 
In his famous paper The Fixation of Belief, Peirce identifies and 
discusses four methods we can use to obtain a settled state of belief 
(Peirce 1955, p. 10ff). In the following diagram, I have renamed each 
quadrant with one of Peirce’s four methods of enquiry: the method of 
tenacity; the method of authority; the a priori method; and the method 
of science. Each method differs from the other three in regard to the 
communicational characteristics used to persuade the participants to 
reach agreement. Put another way, each method solves the problem 
of dissent in relation to university-community engagement in a 
different manner. 
In an ideal world, we have the freedom to choose between these 
methods. Under the constraining influence of the grid-group 
dimensions, however, our choices are restricted by the 
communicational bias of the quadrant we are communicating within, 
or at least, that is the proposition I am investigating in this article via 
Douglas’ grid-group constructs. 
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A Peircean grid-group communicational community diagram. 
TENACITY (ISOLATES B) 
According to Peirce, the method of tenacity operates to maintain 
existing beliefs through avoiding contact with any contradictory 
evidence. People in this quadrant therefore protect themselves from 
doubt by avoiding situations or information that might give rise to 
doubt in the first place. If this is not possible, the individual 
tenaciously clings to a former belief to ward off doubt. In this sense, 
the method of tenacity operates to protect the individual from group 
pressures (hence, weak group), while maintaining a sense of 
powerlessness in relation to the forces of social regulation (hence, 
strong grid). Dissent in this quadrant is equivalent to personal 
disintegration. To ward off this, the individual regresses to an 
existing belief, or an existing rule for action. Holding to this view 
tenaciously will solve the immediate problem at hand. Peirce 
compares the method of tenacity to that of an ostrich burying its head 
in the sand (Peirce 1955, p. 11). Whether it was a good idea to do so 
can only be determined retrospectively. 
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AUTHORITY (HIERARCHY C) 
The method of authority is also based on the recognition of dissent, 
but here we move toward the strong end of the group dimension, 
thus dissent cannot be repressed by the first method (tenacity) as 
effectively. To remain incorporated within the group, if that is the 
intention, the individual, or perhaps a sub-group, must resolve the 
conflict made evident by dissent by submitting the issue to authority, 
for example, to an authorised decision-making process, or perhaps an 
authorised ‘expert’ or ‘judge’. This method, therefore, involves a self-
identification with the pre-authorised beliefs of the group in respect 
to any specific problem and the correct method to solve problems. In 
other words, membership involves a voluntary submission to the 
processes of social regulation, which is why I have located this 
method of fixing belief at the strong end of the grid dimension. Often 
the key issue in this quadrant is whether there is sufficient time or 
resources available to resolve the conflict. If not, a decision will be 
imposed.  
 
A PRIORI (ENCLAVES D) 
The a priori method operates to eradicate dissent through reason, but 
without recourse to experiential evidence. Peirce characterises this 
approach to the fixation of belief as the ‘philosophical’ method. He 
suggests that what we find reasonable via this method is a matter of 
intellectual ‘taste’ or ‘fashion’. In this quadrant, then, whatever an 
individual believes must remain consistent with the opinion of a 
group. It is a group consensus that determines what is to be believed, 
which is why I locate this method at the strong end of the group 
dimension. If a cohesive group’s interpretation of new information 
remains consistent with what is already believed, the information is 
usually found compelling on this basis alone. The third method, 
therefore, resolves dissent through an appeal to the binding power of 
ideas rather than by a submission to authority. Consequently, the 
intellectual freedom of this communicational community cannot be 
closely regulated without reducing it to either of the previous 
methods (tenacity or authority), which is why I locate the a priori 
method at the weak end of the grid dimension. 
 
SCIENCE (INDIVIDUALISM A) 
The method of science operates to eradicate doubt by subjecting 
hypothesised resolutions to dissent to experimentation and 
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observation. I am going to cover the characteristics of this quadrant in 
a little more detail, as how this method goes about resolving disputes 
is key to understanding the role of enquiry in universities. 
As argued earlier, enquiry-based communicational communities 
form around a common concern for a subject matter that is 
independent of what we want to be the case rather than a special 
ideological or philosophical preference. Thus, as I have noted 
elsewhere (Low 2000), enquirers who consider group conformity to 
be more important than finding out what is really the case cannot be 
said to be communicating scientifically. Cooperation in a scientific 
communicational community has as its object the investigation of the 
truth of its subject matter, not the construction of a truth the 
communicational community wants to be true. 
The method of science, therefore, involves factors identified and 
made operational by the other three methods of fixing belief, but 
brings into play one vital extra factor. In the method of science, the 
being of the object of enquiry plays the determining role in the 
fixation of belief. For example, I might say to someone, ‘It’s very 
smoggy today’. The person I say this to might respond by saying, 
‘How do you know that?’ I could then respond by saying, ‘Go 
outside and look at the colour of the sky and smell the air. If you do 
this, you will find that the sky looks brown and the air smells like 
burnt petrol’. If the person I have addressed this claim to does this, 
they will likely be compelled to the same conclusion I have asserted 
via a mediated experiential contact with the subject matter of my 
assertion. In this sense, my communication is meaningful if, and only 
if, my interlocutor responds to my communication appropriately – 
that is, in a manner that will reveal the object of my assertion. If this 
is done, and there remains some disagreement about what is to be 
accepted as the object of my claim (for example, ‘That’s not smog, 
that’s progress!’) this can only be resolved by dialogic enquiry with 
the same object in mind. In this sense, the relational consequences of 
the object of enquiry can only be found out by enquiry. We cannot 
impose our meanings on the object by stipulating that it must be as 
we command or think it to be (the position of the other three 
quadrants). The object of enquiry is free to object to what we say 
about it in the method of science (Latour 2000). 
Even the most complex scientific enquiries follow the basic 
method described above. For our present purpose, then, note that an 
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assertion (that is the conditional proposition asserted to be true) 
made in the science quadrant is made to an audience considered 
distributively rather than collectively. In a scientific community, the 
scientist addresses ‘whomever the assertion may concern’ (Ransdell 
1998). As such, the audience is not a collection of people who must, as 
a group, accept or reject the claim according to whether it coheres 
with an existing system of beliefs (that which we call ‘knowledge’). 
This is why I locate the method of science at the weak end of group. 
Note also that there can never be some kind of mechanical 
procedure that, if adhered to, will guarantee that a claim made in the 
science quadrant is necessarily true (for example, the object of an 
assertion might have changed in some important respect that was not 
anticipated, or the asserter might be mistaken about something). This 
is why I noted earlier that the truth of any claim in science is 
ultimately determined by the subject matter or object of enquiry. No 
amount of social regulation can in itself guarantee that any given 
claim approximates the truth, which is also why I locate the method 
of science at the weak end of the grid dimension. 
In the science quadrant, then, individuals are (ideally) free to 
communicate openly and honestly in relation to a specified subject 
matter of concern. Consequently, there is both less influence and 
control from others (that is, the group dimension), and individuals 
are relatively free from social regulation (the grid dimension). In 
other words, the method of science is dominated by strongly 
competitive conditions and images of individual autonomy. 
I seem to hear my reader ask, ‘But surely the method of science is 
a highly regulated social activity and therefore it should be located in 
the hierarchy quadrant?’ I defend my choice for locating the method 
of science in the weak grid, weak group quadrant on two further 
grounds: first, I agree that science is a social activity. As just noted 
above, when a scientist makes a claim, the scientist does not make it 
to a communicative community considered as a collective. Rather, the 
claim is made to anyone who has an interest in determining the truth 
about the same subject matter (that is, ‘to whom it may concern’). 
This may turn out to be a large number of people, or it may turn out 
to be a single individual, or perhaps even a person or group of people 
not yet born. In this sense, there can be no criterion of membership in 
a scientific communicational community, such as an allegiance to 
what is already believed (the a priori method), or to that which has 
been authorised to be believed (the method of authority), or to what 
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we habitually believe (the method of tenacity). What is required is an 
honest and sincere desire to find out. In short, there must be a 
commitment to the function of truth-seeking in communication. 
Second, scientists, in order to be scientists, must be as free as their 
subject matters. Although the hierarchy quadrant would prefer it if 
nature could be made to remain fixed in place by decree of its policy 
or engineered interventions, nature remains something independent 
of these efforts, as something dynamic and evolving. In this sense, the 
method of science must also be organic. It cannot be highly regulated 
or fixed, that is, not without it becoming overly authoritarian, 
tenacious, or unwilling to admit a new level of information (a priori). 
In sum, my modified grid-group diagram is designed to provide 
an interpretive apparatus within which we can set about describing 
the communicational characteristics of the methods used to fix belief 
in each of the quadrants. The proposed method of analysing 
university-community engagement communication, therefore, 
follows logically from my earlier argument that communicational 
communities are constituted by their communication method. 
Disagreement within a quadrant is thus functionally the same as 
disagreement with one’s self-identified communicational community. 
In this sense, the method for settling opinions operative in each 
quadrant constitutes a suitable name for the communicational 
community of the quadrant. 
  
THE HYPERCYCLE OF UNIVERSITY-COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
The purpose of my modified grid-group diagram is to provide a 
structured typological space within which four distinct social agorae 
for university-community engagement can be identified and 
discussed – both in relation to their internal characteristics, and in 
relation to each other. As Thompson has noted, each of the methods 
identified via any grid-group analysis seriously contradicts the other 
three, yet each is complementary to the regulation of a social system 
as a whole. As Thompson states, the four quadrants: 
 
… form themselves into a hypercycle. Each way of life, 
it turns out, does something for the next that it cannot 
do for itself. (Thompson 2000, p. 191, original 
emphasis) 
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For example, the method of authority would be a suitable 
method for enforcing the business contracts that arise out of the 
method of science. In turn, the excesses of the method of authority 
would provide the a priori method with something to criticise and 
rally around, and the method of tenacity would give the method of 
authority someone to categorise and develop policy in respect to. 
Thus, since each communicational community acts as a source of 
disagreement or difference, it is necessary to the others in a system of 
communication: the reproduction of each way of life ensures the 
survival of the other three. 
As suggested earlier, university-community engagement at a 
generic level is made possible via a method of communication called 
enquiry, which is also why recognising and nurturing a role of 
dissent is so vital to university-community engagement. My findings 
so far suggest, however, that enquiry operates solely in the science 
quadrant of our modified grid-group diagram. The communicational 
constraints of social incorporation (grid) and group membership 
(group) are minimised here, allowing the freedom necessary for 
enquiry within a universe of discourse that is equally free (this is 
most often termed ‘academic freedom’). In the science quadrant, 
anything imaginable is possible and any possibility is imaginable (at 
least in theory). In short, the possibilities for selecting ideas to 
investigate in this quadrant are derived from interactions with a 
universe of discourse that is potentially endless in its possibilities. 
However, it is also this very characteristic of the method of 
science that shows us why universities cannot operate in the science 
quadrant in isolation. There must always be something other than the 
self-referential autonomy of university research to encourage new 
directions for enquiry and to correct errors, for example, when theory 
is put into practice. Put another way, a university must derive 
disagreement and direction from sources that are external to the 
university itself. In this view, when the innovations that emerge from 
the science quadrant find their way to the other three quadrants, they 
are greeted in different ways according to that quadrant’s preferred 
communication method. This in turn determines whether ideas 
derived from the science quadrant are capable of being incorporated 
into a broader social system, and which communication strategies are 
appropriate to achieving this acceptance (Luhmann 1989, p. 82). As 
the hypercycle functions by utilising each communication method 
(that is, each method for fixing belief), each method is necessary.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES 
Each of the communicational commitments I have identified arises 
out of a distinct method of fixing belief, and each is proposed to be 
necessary to a university-community engagement communication 
system. One of the advantages of grid-group analysis, then, is that it 
enables us to see that there are a number of paths that could be used 
to engage the system with those matters relevant to the life of 
universities. 
Our diagram also reveals a number of concomitant difficulties 
due to conflicting communication methods and assumptions. As we 
have seen, each quadrant has a distinctive method for processing 
communication, thus we cannot assume that a communication 
generated in the science quadrant, for example, will be interpreted or 
discussed in the same way in another communication quadrant. 
Indeed, the analysis undertaken here would suggest that such an 
expectation is impossible. The new will always be processed in a 
different manner in the other quadrants. This is to be expected, as, 
after all, there is no need to communicate research to an audience 
when the object of the research is already known and accepted by 
that audience. In this sense, university-community communication is 
premised on failure – if it doesn’t surprise an audience to some 
degree, it’s not something new that is being communicated. 
Perri 6 et al. (2006, pp. 75–76) have analysed the idea of surprises 
within the context of grid-group theory. Their analysis helps us think 
about what is likely to occur when communications generated within 
the science quadrant move to the other three quadrants. Grid-group 
analysis suggests that if the findings of a university research 
programme are to be successfully disseminated and taken up in the 
other quadrants, each of these quadrants should be thought of as a 
distinct audience with a distinct method of processing messages. 
Thompson (2000, p. 192), for example, proposes that each quadrant 
has a distinct ‘information handling style’ which enables it to accept 
or reject messages from other quadrants. In respect to university-
community engagement communication, Thompson’s study and the 
recent work of Perri 6 et al., as well as our own efforts, suggest that 
the following considerations may be pertinent to designing better 
communication strategies for university-community engagement 
when such communication is generated by the science quadrant. 
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TENACITY QUADRANT 
Information from the science quadrant is neither selected nor rejected 
in any particular way by the method of tenacity. This is due to the 
social isolation implicit to the quadrant’s positioning at the weak end 
of the group dimension. Autonomy is restricted by social structures 
and these structures are largely beyond the control of the individual 
(strong grid), hence the theme of this quadrant is, ‘What you don’t 
know can’t harm you’. Broadcast media, such as television or radio, 
are therefore often enlisted to communicate with this quadrant. The 
idea is to create as many points of attraction as possible so that the 
new idea can establish itself. However, grid-group analysis would 
also suggest that messages conveyed by the popular media will fail  
in this quadrant unless the message is closely matched to existing 
structures and beliefs. For example, a message designed to motivate 
recycling would fail unless there were social structures in place to 
enable recycling. Similarly, a new rule for action may need to be 
strategically ‘reframed’ so that the individual can act in accordance 
with their existing frameworks and communication preferences 
(Shellenberger & Nordhaus 2005). For example, medical researchers 
may increasingly find their work is disseminated to this quadrant 
through self-help groups on the internet, or via popular television 
programs such as ER or House (Van Dijck 2003). As these sources  
are not seen as ‘official sources of authorised university-community 
engagement’, individuals in this quadrant do not feel threatened or 
overwhelmed by them and can select out information that helps  
them survive.  
 
AUTHORITY QUADRANT 
Information in the authority quadrant is meticulously analysed and 
classified systematically, preferably via a large bureaucracy with vast 
information technology resources available to assist in the task. If the 
information entering this quadrant has not been correctly coded, 
corrective instructions are sent back to the science quadrant. ‘More 
research’ might be commissioned, or alternatively, research that is 
not deemed useful to the authority quadrant’s predetermined 
categories and priorities is ‘axed’. This quadrant would, therefore, 
have a focus on what is appropriate communication from the science 
quadrant. Consequently, universities communicating from the 
science quadrant to this quadrant do so primarily through authorised 
 
 
 
Gateways | Low 
 
121 
channels such as submissions, hearings and enquiries, for example. 
As Douglas and Calvez have argued in regard to an earlier grid-
group analysis (1990, p. 460), communication between the science 
quadrant and the authority quadrant can be thought of as a ‘positive 
diagonal’. In this sense, there is a functional alliance between the 
method of authority and the method of science. The authority 
quadrant commissions research, and the science quadrant carries it 
out. However, this close alliance is not without its problems. As 
noted above, the authoritarian quadrant may attempt to ‘discipline’ 
the science quadrant, thereby killing off the freedoms of the science 
quadrant that enable researchers to produce insight. Similarly, the 
authority quadrant may self-regulate itself into an information 
gridlock through over-regulation, effectively preventing any new 
information from entering.  
 
A PRIORI QUADRANT 
The social solidarity of this communicational quadrant is built 
around exposure to the failings of the other quadrants. As such, 
conflict sustains this quadrant and information is selected on the 
basis of whether it conforms to what is already believed to be the 
case. The uncertain and provisional shades of grey of the science 
quadrant are therefore quickly transformed into ‘black and white’  
by the a priori quadrant. In other words, doubt is either transformed 
into knowing, or knowing nothing. Indeed, in order to maintain its 
absence of structure (weak grid), the a priori method handles new 
information by subjecting it to a consensus process. In consensus, 
participants carrying new information can either join in, or refuse to 
join in. Thus, new information that cannot be incorporated via 
consensus is labelled ‘the enemy’. This would seem to indicate that 
the content of communication directed at a priori groups should be 
selected to conform to (or ‘partner with’) the oppositional purpose of 
the social solidarity or it will be rejected. 
Perri 6 et al. (2006, p. 75) note that universities communicating 
with this quadrant may encounter the following dynamic. The lack of 
grid (institutionalisation) makes the support of authority within a 
priori groups difficult. As such, they will be unable to sustain 
negotiations with outsiders due to their inability to sustain effective 
authority internally. Given this, it may be best to approach groups 
operating under the communication principles of this quadrant only 
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if they are at the early stages of their formation. In this case, the 
information supplied will be used to strengthen common beliefs and 
maintain a sense of boundary. 
When communicating with groups in the latter stages of their 
development, however, thought might be given to whether the 
characteristic passionate loyalty and protective impulses of this 
quadrant will function to reject university-community engagement 
efforts, no matter how well intentioned. The alternative danger noted 
above is that any communication will have to be so seriously 
distorted to be rendered acceptable, that it will no longer be 
meaningfully linked with its intended object. 
 
WIDER IMPLICATIONS 
The previous discussion is largely premised on the assumption that 
the science quadrant is where new ideas are most easily generated 
due to the favourable levels of grid and group. This is perhaps why it 
is often incorrectly assumed that ideas generated in this quadrant 
should be the focus of university-community engagement. As noted 
earlier, however, there are many other reasons a university might 
want to engage – for example, to recruit new students, to draw in 
donations, or to teach vocationally. These tasks may be best 
performed in a different quadrant and therefore the staff involved 
will adhere to a quite different method of fixing belief. 
For example, within the a priori quadrant an idea must appear 
reasonable or it will be rejected. To seem reasonable, and therefore no 
longer be open to dispute, ideas in this quadrant are called 
‘knowledge’. Notions of ‘verification’ and ‘empirical validity’ lead to 
an expectation that everyone should also believe in and accept the 
knowledge of this quadrant. As such, groups operating in this 
quadrant believe they can capture and embed knowledge in 
structures such as field manuals, operational procedures, predictive 
models or ‘best practice’ exemplars. 
As stressed earlier, applying the above communication forms to 
the work of the science quadrant will be self-limiting and 
unproductive. Imposing pre-determined patterns in the science 
quadrant kills off the very creative process one hopes to facilitate. 
Seen from the other direction, then, ideas generated in the science 
quadrant may appear to the a priori quadrant to be either insane or 
pointless (Kurtz & Snowden 2003). This is because the ideas of the 
science quadrant are research ideas and as such are largely useless, at 
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least until some later time. It may take decades or even generations 
for the ideas generated in the science quadrant to be transformed 
through the hypercycle into ‘knowledge’ in the a priori quadrant. 
The above is why university-community engagement strategies 
created from the ‘knowledge’ point of view of the a priori quadrant 
may not work as expected. For example, the a priori quadrant might 
use a case study approach to develop a set of guidelines for 
university-community engagement that it is claimed can be 
replicated in contexts that have not yet been studied. Applying these 
a priori guidelines to the science quadrant, for example, would only 
serve to precipitate confusion, as in the science quadrant patterns are 
viewed as uncertain and goal-based directives are viewed with 
scepticism. 
Perri 6 et al. has examined some of the self-limiting and 
unproductive communicational characteristics of the a priori 
quadrant in detail (2006, p. 75). They argue that since this quadrant 
structures itself according to asymmetric status and power relations 
based on role, informal networks that get participants to put aside 
their formal roles temporarily can be used to create boundary 
linkages. For example, to create communication linkages with the 
science quadrant, they recommend that industry leaders and 
government officials be encouraged to participate in science quadrant 
activities. This social learning strategy can exploit the formation of 
bridging networks that unfreeze the institutionalised gridlock so 
characteristic of the a priori quadrant. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The discussions above indicate ways to think through the strategic 
implications of university-community engagement communication 
via grid-group analysis. I have argued that our starting point for the 
task should always be to view university-community engagement as 
an enquiry activity. This has led to me suggest that at a social system 
level, the general purpose of university-community engagement is to 
find ways of linking the new ideas generated by a university into a 
broader, more complex social system. 
As precautionary corollary to the above, I suggest that we note 
that an entirely new idea, or what Peirce called a ‘detached idea’, can 
never be created by a university. Put another way, the semiotic 
epistemology for grid-group analysis developed here suggests that 
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an entirely new object of research cannot be engaged with (Lyne 
1982). The reason for this, according to Peirce, is that the best we can 
do is fill out and correct already existing ideas (Peirce 1998, p. 327). 
As Peirce observed: 
 
As to detached ideas, they are of value only so far as, 
directly or indirectly, they can be made conducive to 
the development of systems of ideas. There is no such 
thing as an absolutely detached idea. It would be no 
idea at all. For an idea is itself a continuous system. 
But of ideas those are most suggestive which, 
detached though they seem, are in fact fragments 
broken from great systems. (Peirce 1976, p. 346) 
 
Thus, we might say that university-community engagement is a 
task that involves drawing from the experience and existing beliefs of 
the community, as well as giving to any community an expanded or 
corrected method for accessing a shared and revised subject matter. 
Given the above, university-community engagement might also 
be said to be a method of communication that welds the dialogic of 
university-community engagement into a common mind: 
 
This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all 
that is, and must be, well understood between utterer 
and interpreter, at the outset, in order that the 
[communication] in question should fulfil its function. 
(Peirce 1976, p. 478, original emphasis) 
 
I have stressed that the social system relies heavily on the method 
of science to draw new information from the universe of the possible 
into the social commens. Further, I have suggested that it is only in 
the communicational community known as science that a reality 
independent of what we think, but not thinking generally, is given 
epistemological and ontological status. That is, it is only in the science 
quadrant that the universe can be engaged with dialogically as an 
equal partner in our enquiry process. In this sense, the science 
quadrant allows a social system to experience that which is other 
than itself, and listen and respond to the surprises the other can offer. 
The findings of this article therefore suggest that society does not 
rely on science to guide its actions exclusively. Our grid-group 
analysis indicates that society uses four distinctly different methods 
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of communication to regulate itself. From a systems point of view, 
then, the method of science serves a Janus-like function in university-
community engagement. It presents society with the opportunity to 
protect itself from threatening new ideas (by suppressing or ignoring 
the new), as well as the opportunity to incorporate and embrace new 
ideas (Luhmann 1989, p. 83). This finding also supports a more 
general thesis: that is, to find a balance between the demands we 
make of the universe (and the universe’s capacity to remain 
integrated with us) involves recognising that which is other than us 
as a dialogical collaborator of equal status with society. If this does 
not happen, human communication tends to become oppressive of 
difference, introducing imbalances and disconnections that cause 
harm (such as food shortages, global warming, war). 
A social system can only deal with the above imbalances and 
disconnections if they are recognised and legitimised as concerns that 
are derived from, and necessary to, its method of communication. 
University-community engagement therefore plays a vital role in 
maintaining the flow of communication between society and a 
universe of discourse that is independent of what we want to be  
the case. 
 
REFERENCES 
Australian Universities Community Engagement Alliance 2005, Funding 
Australian universities for community engagement, Australian Universities 
Community Engagement Alliance, Penrith, Queensland. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia 2002, Higher education at the crossroads: An 
overview paper, Department of Education, Science and Training, Canberra. 
 
Corrington, RS 1994, Ecstatic naturalism: Signs of the world, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington. 
 
Douglas, M 1973, Natural symbols: Explorations in cosmology, Penguin, 
London. 
 
Douglas, M 1982a, In the active voice, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 
 
Douglas, M (ed.) 1982b, Essays in the sociology of perception, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London. 
 
Douglas, M 1989, ‘The background of the grid dimension: A comment’, 
Sociological Analysis, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 171–176. 
 
Douglas, M 2001, A feeling for hierarchy, unpublished manuscript, (draft 3, 
November 1). 
 
 
 
 
Gateways | Low 
 
126 
 
Douglas, M & Calvez, M 1990, ‘The self as risk taker: A cultural theory of 
contagion in relation to AIDS’, The Sociological Review, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 445–
464. 
 
Douglas, M & Wildavsky, A 1982, Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of 
technical and environmental dangers, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
 
Hawes, L 1999, ‘The dialogics of conversation: Power, control, vulnerability’, 
Communication Theory, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 229–264. 
 
Innovative Research Universities Australia 2006, Response to DEST knowledge 
transfer project, Innovative Research Universities Australia, Nathan, 
Queensland. 
 
Kecskes, K 2006, ‘Behind the rhetoric: Applying a cultural theory lens to 
community-campus partnership development’, Michigan Journal of 
Community Service Learning, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 5–14. 
 
Kevelson, R 1993, Peirce's esthetics of freedom: Possibility, complexity, and 
emergent value, Peter Lang, New York. 
 
Kurtz, C & Snowden, D 2003, ‘The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making 
in a complex and complicated world’, IBM Systems Journal, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 
462–483. 
 
Latour, B 2000, ‘When things strike back: A possible contribution of ‘science 
studies’ to the social sciences’, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 
107–123. 
 
Low, D 2000, ‘The nonviolent principles of scientific communication’, 
Australian Journal of Communication, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 39–48. 
 
Low, D 2003, Environmental communication: Dissent, conflict, enquiry, PhD. 
Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra. 
 
Luhmann, N 1989, Ecological communication, trans. J Bednarz Jr, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Luhmann, N (ed.) 1990, Essays on self-reference, Columbia University Press, 
New York. 
 
Lyne, J 1982, ‘C. S. Peirce's philosophy of rhetoric’, in B Vickers (ed.), 
Rhetoric revalued: Papers from the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, 
Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, New York. 
 
Mamadouh, V 1999, ‘Grid-group cultural theory: An introduction’, 
Geojournal, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 395–409 
 
McGee, M & Lyne, J 1987, ‘What are nice folks like you doing in a place like 
this? Some entailments of treating knowledge claims rhetorically’, in JS 
Nelson, A Megill & DN McClosky (eds), The rhetoric of the human sciences: 
 
 
 
Gateways | Low 
 
127 
Language and argument in scholarship and human affairs, University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, pp. 381–406. 
 
Nicholls, A 2000, ‘The secularization of revelation from Plato to Freud’, 
Contretemps, vol 1, September, pp. 62–70. 
 
Peirce, C 1955, in J Buchler (ed.), Philosophical writings of Peirce, Dover, New 
York. 
 
Peirce, C 1976, in C Eisele (ed.), The new elements of mathematics, vol. 4, 
Mouton, The Hague. 
 
Peirce, C 1998, in Peirce Edition Project (eds), The essential Peirce: Selected 
philosophical writings, vol. 2, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 
 
Perelman, C 1982, The realm of rhetoric, trans. W. Kluback, University of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. 
 
6, P, Goodwin, N, Peck, E & Freeman, T 2006, Managing networks of twenty-
first century organisations, Palgrave, New York. 
 
Ransdell, J 1998, ‘Sciences as communicational communities’  
(Ver 3.1, online). Viewed 2 February 2007, 
http://cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/physics.htm 
 
Shellenberger, M & Nordhaus, T 2005, ‘The death of environmentalism’, The 
Sun, no. 350, pp. 12–15. 
 
Spickard, J 1989, ‘A guide to Mary Douglas's three versions of grid/group 
theory’, Sociological Analysis, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 151–170. 
 
Thompson, M 1992, ‘The dynamics of cultural theory and their implications 
for the enterprise culture’, in S Hargreaves Heap & A Ross (eds), 
Understanding the enterprise culture: Themes in the work of Mary Douglas, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. 
 
Thompson, M 2000, ‘Global networks and local cultures: What are the 
mismatches and what can be done about them?’ in C Engel & KH Keller 
(eds), Understanding the impact of global networks on local, social, political and 
cultural values, Nomos, Baden-Baden. 
 
Van Dijck, J 2003, ‘After the ‘two cultures’: Toward a ‘(multi)cultural’ 
practice of science communication’, Science Communication, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 
177–190. 
 
Winter, A, Wiseman, J & Muirhead, B 2006, ‘University-community 
engagement in Australia: Practice, policy and public good’, Education, 
Citizenship and Social Justice, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 211–230.  
